A probability alone does not determine what to do. A physician considering treatment must weigh the chance of disease against both the benefit of treatment and the harm of treating someone unnecessarily. Expected utility combines the likelihood and desirability of an action’s possible outcomes into one measure for comparing choices. section 7.1 section 7.1.1
For an action a, expected utility is EU(a) = Σθ u(a, θ)p(θ | data). Here θ is a possible state of the world, u(a, θ) is the utility of the action–state outcome, and p(θ | data) is its posterior probability given the evidence. Multiply each outcome’s utility by its probability and sum across states; the preferred action maximizes this sum. For continuous states, an integral replaces the sum. section 7.2.2
Utility represents relative desirability on a common scale. It need not be monetary: benefits, costs, risks, and discomfort can all matter. The resulting recommendation depends on the actions considered, the estimated probabilities, and the utilities assigned. section 7.1 section 10.2.6
Treatment after a positive test
Suppose the posterior probability of disease is 0.09. With the illustrative utilities shown, treatment has expected utility 0.09(100) + 0.91(−10) = −0.1; no treatment has expected utility 0.09(0) + 0.91(100) = 91. On these assumptions, no treatment is preferred. A different assessment of the consequences could change the comparison. section 7.1.1 section 10.2.6
Table 7.1 Utilities for each combination of action and disease state.
|
State
of the world
|
Treat
|
Do not treat
|
|
Disease present
|
+100 (successful cure)
|
0 (no treatment, poor outcome)
|
|
Disease absent
|
-10 (unnecessary treatment)
|
+100 (avoid discomfort)
|
The utility table makes the consequences of each treatment–disease combination explicit. section 7.1.1
The same choice can be expressed through opportunity loss: compare each outcome with the best outcome available in that state, then weight the losses by state probabilities. Minimizing expected opportunity loss identifies the same preferred action as maximizing expected utility. Decision trees extend the reasoning to sequences of choices and uncertain events; value-of-information analysis asks whether acquiring more evidence is worthwhile. section 7.3.2 section 7.6
A preferred action is not guaranteed to produce the best outcome. Expected utility makes a choice coherent with the available evidence and stated preferences, but uncertainty remains. section 7.6


