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Secure boot

As explained in Real-World Cryptography

Secure boot is a boot process that verifies the authenticity and integrity of each program before executing it.

Imagine malware replacing the program that starts your computer. Secure boot prevents that first compromise from becoming an evil operating system by checking each boot stage before it runs. section 13.2.4

A hardware root of trust begins a verification chain:

  • Immutable boot ROM prepares protected memory and loads the next boot program. section 13.2.4
  • The ROM hashes the program and verifies its signature against a public key stored in the ROM. section 13.2.4
  • Each trusted boot loader repeats the process until a verified loader starts the operating system. section 13.2.4

Unsigned updates

A phone can reject an operating-system update that lacks the vendor’s signature, because the boot chain cannot establish trust in it. section 13.2.4

Figure 13.3 A chip implementing the TPM 2.0 standard, plugged into a motherboard. This chip can be called by the system’s motherboard components as well as user applications running on the computer’s OS. Photo from Wikipedia (http://mng.bz/Q2je).

A TPM 2.0 chip illustrates the hardware foundation that supports secure boot and other trusted operations. section 13.2.4

How Real-World Cryptography covers it

How deep it goes
Explains a chained verification procedure from immutable ROM through boot loaders, stopping short of implementation detail.
Examples
Uses infected boot processes, Apple Secure Enclave ROM, TPMs, and rejected unsigned phone updates.
What you can do after
Evaluate how a device establishes trust from immutable hardware through the operating-system boot stage.
How it connects
Connects hardware roots of trust, TPMs, boot loaders, hashes, digital signatures, and operating-system updates.

This explainer was generated by Manning's knowledge graph from the text of Real-World Cryptography. The section links point to the parts of the book it draws on.