When someone claims that a message came from a trusted signer, signature verification checks the claim rather than trusting the message outright. It combines the signed message, the signer’s public key, and the signature; the result is valid or invalid. section 1.4.3
A basic verification flow is:
- Receive the message, signature, and purported signer’s public key. section 1.4.3
- Run the signature algorithm against those three pieces. section 1.4.3
- Accept the signature only when the result validates; otherwise reject it. section 1.4.3
Alice’s trust statement
Queen Alice signs “I, Queen Alice, trust Lord Bob” with her private key. Lord David uses Alice’s public key, the statement, and the signature to decide whether it is valid. section 1.4.3
Figure 1.14 To verify a signature from Queen Alice, one also needs the message signed and Queen Alice’s public key. The result is either validating the signature or invalidating it.
A verification diagram makes the three required inputs and the validating-or-invalidating outcome easy to inspect. section 1.4.3
Verification is only as dependable as the implementation. RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature implementations have contained flaws that enabled forgery attacks, especially when backward compatibility requires this older scheme. section 7.3.1



