An impossibility theorem proves that no preference-aggregation rule can satisfy every specified fairness criterion at once. In social choice theory, this limits what optimization methods can guarantee when combining individual preferences. section 10.5 section 10.6
The result matters for RLHF because human preferences are noisy, context-dependent, temporally shifting, and sometimes non-transitive. Aggregation therefore requires trade-offs rather than a universally fair solution. section 10.5 section 10.6
Practical implications include:
- Treat scalar utility models as useful abstractions rather than complete representations of human values. section 10.5 section 10.6
- Expect tensions among fairness, value alignment, and corrigibility when preference models guide AI behavior. section 10.5
- Focus RLHF on tractable objectives such as style and performance instead of claiming to resolve human values completely. section 10.6
Preference aggregation in RLHF
When preferences differ across people, places, or situations, one aggregation method cannot preserve every fairness criterion simultaneously. An RLHF pipeline can still optimize collected judgments for style or performance, but its result reflects chosen trade-offs and modeling assumptions. section 10.5 section 10.6
