A matching is stable when no unmatched pair would both prefer each other to their current partners. Such a pair could disrupt the assignment by switching, so stability rules out mutually desirable alternatives. section 2.0
Students and universities
Suppose X ranks Alice first, Y ranks Bob first, and Z ranks Carol first; each student also ranks that university first. Pairing X with Alice, Y with Bob, and Z with Carol leaves no unmatched pair that prefers one another. section 2.1.1
Gale–Shapley builds stable matches through proposals and temporary acceptances. Stability does not mean every participant gets an ideal match: the proposing side tends to fare better, and a stable result need not be optimal for everyone. section 2.0 section 2.3.2
The same idea is adapted to settings such as residency placement and ride-sharing, where avoiding mutually preferable alternatives can help limit withdrawals, cancellations, or other disruptions. section 2.2.4 section 2.2.2
