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Replay attack

A replay attack is an attack in which previously captured valid messages, requests, or authentication data are retransmitted to produce an unauthorized effect.

How 3 Manning books explain it

Software Security for Developers

A replay attack is an attack in which a valid previously captured message or credential is retransmitted to obtain an unauthorized effect.

How it is used
Protects payments, OIDC authentication responses, magic links, and service-to-service requests from unauthorized reuse.
How deep it goes
Explains interception, repetition, tampering, nonces, timestamps, signatures, and one-time tokens without detailing cryptographic algorithms.
Examples
Uses repeated payment requests, tampered transfers, signed inventory requests, WebAuthn challenges, and reusable magic-link tokens.
What you can do after
Diagnose replay risk by checking request freshness, uniqueness, integrity, binding, and one-time credential invalidation.

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The Design of Web APIs, Second Edition

Request replay is the repeated submission of a previously captured API request, potentially causing an operation to occur more than once.

How it is used
Protects API data integrity when consumers retry operations after missing or unexpected responses.
How deep it goes
Explains duplicate creation, unique request identifiers, conflict responses, business checks, and explicit duplicate confirmation.
Examples
Uses retried orders and money transfers to demonstrate duplicate operations and uncertain server processing.
What you can do after
Operate/configure APIs with unique request identifiers, conflict handling, and business-level duplicate checks.

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Real-World Cryptography

A replay attack resends a previously valid message and its authentication data so that they may be accepted again as current.

How it is used
Protects authenticated message exchanges from accepting previously valid messages as new.
How deep it goes
Explains the threat, counter defense, key rotation, nonce sequencing, and variable-length ambiguity without implementation detail.
Examples
Uses Alice-and-Bob message exchange, Rust HMAC code, TLS records, and replayable 0-RTT application data.
What you can do after
Diagnose replay exposure, add counter or nonce sequencing, and restrict 0-RTT to safely replayable operations.

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Related concepts

These guides are generated from the text of Manning books by Manning's knowledge graph and link to the sections they draw on. The full books are available on liveBook and at manning.com.