Agency is the capacity to initiate action and regulate behavior in pursuit of goals one treats as one’s own. It includes forming goals, revising plans, and responding to consequences as circumstances change. Intelligence and agency are related but distinct: a system can reason or solve problems without generating its own goals. section 5.4.2 section 9.5.4
Human goals are not created from nothing. Needs, learned preferences, habits, culture, and environmental pressures shape what people pursue. Agency is therefore not pure self-origination; it is a layered capacity to pursue and redirect goals within constraints. section 9.5.4 section 5.4.2
Artificial neural networks operate within arrangements that supply their objectives, inputs, and stopping conditions. A model produces outputs when prompted and optimizes during training, but remains inert otherwise. Coherent, goal-directed behavior within a task is not by itself evidence that the model generated the goal or can decide what matters. section 5.4.2
Agentic systems can be built around language models using tools, memory, and external objectives. From a skeptical perspective, their agency is borrowed: designers, users, prompts, and surrounding software supply the goals, while success and failure are external evaluations rather than stakes the model experiences. This limitation changes the kind of intelligence involved without settling whether intelligence is present. section 9.4.3 section 9.5.4
Figure 9.14 Agency and intelligence. Humans usually combine agency and intelligence, making the two easy to confuse even though they are different capacities. Agency concerns pursuing goals as one’s own; intelligence concerns understanding, reasoning, planning, and solving problems.

The figure contrasts pursuing goals as one’s own with understanding, reasoning, planning, and problem solving. section 9.5.4
Conversational continuity
A system may sound warm, recall prior exchanges, and maintain a conversational persona. Those behaviors can make an interaction feel continuous, but they do not establish awareness, commitment, agency, or care in the relational sense. Users may nevertheless attach significant meaning to the exchange. section 8.5.4
The distinction matters for judgment and responsibility. Mistaking task-directed behavior for self-directed agency can lead to excessive expectations of autonomy. A system without self-originating goals cannot be morally autonomous or bear responsibility for its actions, even if it displays cognitive performance. section 5.4.2 section 9.5.4





