A network service-based decoy imitates a legitimate HTTP, RDP, SMB, or SSH service so closely that adversaries cannot easily distinguish it from a real asset. Contact or interaction triggers an alert for threat hunters. section 10.2.3
Effective deployment depends on environmental fit and secrecy. A decoy should resemble services already present; an unusual FTP service may expose the deception to sophisticated adversaries. Knowledge of the decoy should remain limited to operational teams that need it. section 10.2.3
A practical deployment workflow connects the decoy to a credible adversary path:
- Select a service that matches the environment. In a predominantly Windows network, RDP is more convincing than VNC or SSH for remote server management. section 10.2.4
- Place the decoy where an intruder could plausibly reach it after initial access, such as among servers used for lateral movement. section 10.2.4
- Enable Windows event logging for RDP so access attempts and activity on the decoy become observable. section 10.2.4
- Route interactions to the hunting function and investigate them as probable adversary activity rather than ordinary administrative use. section 10.2.3 section 10.2.4
RDP decoy after initial compromise
An adversary obtains initial access, harvests credentials, and attempts RDP access to move through the Windows network. The realistic decoy records the interaction and sends an alert, exposing activity that might otherwise resemble legitimate remote administration. section 10.2.4
