A positive diagnostic test is evidence of disease, but its meaning also depends on how likely the disease was before the test. That starting probability is the prior probability. More generally, a prior distribution represents uncertainty about an unknown quantity before new data are incorporated; it can reflect existing knowledge, experience, or theory. section 2.2.2 section 2.2.1 section 3.2.4
For a hypothesis H and observed data D, Bayes’ theorem gives P(H | D) = P(D | H) × P(H) / P(D). The prior P(H) describes the hypothesis before the new data; the likelihood P(D | H) measures how well it explains those data. The evidence P(D) accounts for the data across competing hypotheses and normalizes the result. The posterior P(H | D) is the revised probability. section 2.2.1 section 2.2
A rare disease and a positive test
Suppose disease prevalence is 0.001, test sensitivity is 0.99, and the false-positive rate is 0.01. The prior probability of no disease is 0.999. A positive result can arise either from disease or from a false positive, so P(positive) = 0.99 × 0.001 + 0.01 × 0.999 = 0.01098. The posterior probability of disease is 0.00099 / 0.01098, approximately 9%. The result raises the probability substantially, but it is not a definitive diagnosis. section 2.2.2 section 10.2.1
The prior matters because evidence is interpreted against what was plausible beforehand. In diagnosis, prevalence, seasonal trends, and clinical experience can inform initial beliefs; symptoms and tests can then revise them. Priors also introduce assumptions that can affect estimates. Fisher objected to assigning distributions to fixed but unknown parameters, arguing that inference should instead rest on observed data and the assumed probability model. section 2.1 section 3.2.4











