Threat modeling makes security rigor visible where failure may expose sensitive data, distort financial outcomes, or create legal consequences. It helps distinguish acceptable compromise from dangerous neglect. section 3.5
Pair threat modeling with controls that the team can operate and test:
- Review security boundaries, least-privilege access, encryption requirements, secrets management, network exposure, and periodic access. section 3.5
- Increase rigor when failure is difficult to reverse, hard to detect, broad in impact, or costly through security, financial, legal, or operational consequences. section 3.5
Table 3.5 Decision rigor rubric
|
Factor
|
Lower rigor
may be acceptable when...
|
Higher
rigor is justified when...
|
|
Reversibility
|
The
decision can be changed, rolled back, or replaced without major disruption.
|
The
decision is hard to reverse once data, users, integrations, or operational
processes depend on it.
|
|
Detectability
|
Failure is
visible quickly through tests, monitoring, user feedback, or operational
signals.
|
Failure can
remain hidden, appear later, or silently corrupt data, calculations,
permissions, or business outcomes.
|
|
Blast
radius
|
Failure
affects a small internal group, a temporary workflow, or a non-critical
capability.
|
Failure
affects customers, money, safety, compliance, sensitive data, or core
operations.
|
|
Cost of
failure
|
The
consequence is inconvenience, rework, delay, or local operational pain.
|
The
consequence is legal exposure, financial loss, security breach, regulatory
failure, physical harm, or major reputational damage.
|
|
Recovery
|
The team
can recover through rollback, retry, correction, or a known manual process.
|
Recovery
requires coordinated incident response, data repair, customer communication,
regulatory reporting, or complex restoration.
|
Use the decision-rigor rubric to weigh reversibility, detectability, blast radius, and failure cost before deciding how deeply to threat-model a system. section 3.5










