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Threat model

As explained in Software Architecture Decision-Making

Threat modeling is the systematic identification and analysis of threats, attack paths, and mitigations for a system.

Threat modeling makes security rigor visible where failure may expose sensitive data, distort financial outcomes, or create legal consequences. It helps distinguish acceptable compromise from dangerous neglect. section 3.5

Pair threat modeling with controls that the team can operate and test:

  • Review security boundaries, least-privilege access, encryption requirements, secrets management, network exposure, and periodic access. section 3.5
  • Increase rigor when failure is difficult to reverse, hard to detect, broad in impact, or costly through security, financial, legal, or operational consequences. section 3.5
Table 3.5 Decision rigor rubric
Factor
Lower rigor may be acceptable when...
Higher rigor is justified when...
Reversibility
The decision can be changed, rolled back, or replaced without major disruption.
The decision is hard to reverse once data, users, integrations, or operational processes depend on it.
Detectability
Failure is visible quickly through tests, monitoring, user feedback, or operational signals.
Failure can remain hidden, appear later, or silently corrupt data, calculations, permissions, or business outcomes.
Blast radius
Failure affects a small internal group, a temporary workflow, or a non-critical capability.
Failure affects customers, money, safety, compliance, sensitive data, or core operations.
Cost of failure
The consequence is inconvenience, rework, delay, or local operational pain.
The consequence is legal exposure, financial loss, security breach, regulatory failure, physical harm, or major reputational damage.
Recovery
The team can recover through rollback, retry, correction, or a known manual process.
Recovery requires coordinated incident response, data repair, customer communication, regulatory reporting, or complex restoration.

Use the decision-rigor rubric to weigh reversibility, detectability, blast radius, and failure cost before deciding how deeply to threat-model a system. section 3.5

How Software Architecture Decision-Making covers it

How deep it goes
Positions threat modeling within security-boundary rigor but does not detail modeling procedures, threat taxonomies, or attack-path analysis.
Examples
Uses missing encryption at rest and storage exposed to public networks as examples of weak security boundaries.
What you can do after
Evaluate where security rigor is mandatory and identify controls that teams can operate, test, and review periodically.
How it connects
Connects threat modeling with least privilege, encryption, secrets management, network exposure review, data integrity, and resilience.

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This explainer was generated by Manning's knowledge graph from the text of Software Architecture Decision-Making. The section links point to the parts of the book it draws on.